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Peru
Javier Olivera Angulo
history
The current situation of the elderly in Peru, a population showing continuous 
growth, reflects the extension of the living conditions they experience during 
their economically active periods to their elderly years. A significant portion of 
this population faces a situation of unmet needs and difficulties sustaining them-
selves economically, which limits their ability to retire from the labor market. 
The traditional pension system covers one-fourth of the population aged 65 and 
older, with even less coverage of those who live in rural areas and in the poorest 
regions of Peru.
Profile of the Elderly
Although Peru is currently classified as a country in the moderate stage of popu-
lation aging, the continued increase in life expectancy and the fall in fertility 
(figure 13.1 and table 13.1) will accelerate its rate of aging. Currently the popu-
lation aged 65 and older is about 6 percent of the total population, a percentage 
that is expected will increase to 17.1 percent in 2050 and to 29.9 percent in 
2100 (CELADE 2011). Additionally, the share of the eldest individuals (persons 
age 80 and older) will grow substantially, from less than 1 percent of the popula-
tion today to more than 12 percent in 2100.
On the one hand, the shift toward a lower fertility rate means that the 
elderly will have few children to support then, and on the other, the longer life 
expectancy will mean that adult children’s cost of caring for their parents will 
stretch over a longer period. These two forces will necessarily reduce the value 
of the children as social insurance, which is more important as a substitute for 
social security for poor populations and of traditional values than in terms of 
parents’ care.
The living conditions of the current generation of the elderly have been deter-
mined in good measure by the opportunities that they had in the past. Table 13.2 
reveals the uncertainty surrounding these past opportunities for the elderly that 
today are between 65 and 80 years old. The high level of illiteracy and the low 
level of educational achievement among this generation, especially for women, 
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Figure 13.1 population structure, by large Age Groups, 1950–2100
Source: Based on Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) 2011.
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table 13.1 evolution of Demographic indicators, 1950–2100
1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100
Total fertility rate 6.85 5.38 2.8 2.05 1.75 1.79 1.89
Life expectancy at birth 43.90 58.53 71.61 76.33 79.68 82.44 84.27
Percentage of population 65+ 3.46 3.56 4.83 8.76 17.10 25.70 29.89
Percentage of population 80+ 0.33 0.34 0.78 1.87 4.67 9.23 12.45
Source: Based on Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) 2011.
table 13.2 characteristics of persons Aged 36–51 Years in the 1981 census
Percent
Description Men Women Total
Illiteracy 12 35 24
Primary education or less 67 77 72
Piped potable water within the dwelling 44 45 45
Piped sewer drainage within the dwelling 35 36 36
Dwelling walls made of good quality materials 37 36 37
Source: Based on 1981 Population Census, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INEI).
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stand out and have played a large part in determining their opportunities and 
current situations.
Additionally, we can observe the differences in education by region and level 
of poverty of the elderly. The literacy rate for individuals from 65 to 69 years old 
in urban areas is 86.2 percent, whereas in rural areas it is 49.3 percent. This indi-
cates that the distribution of opportunities in the past has been noticeably 
unequal across the country (figure 13.2).
In terms of age group, the poverty rate among persons aged 65 and older 
is 28.4 percent, which is less than the national average of 30.8 percent. 
Children exhibit the highest poverty rate among all age groups. Until age 13, 
the poverty rate remains above 40 percent and then drops, only to increase 
again between 25 and 40 years old and after age 60 (figure 13.3).1 Significant 
differences are seen between poverty measured in urban and rural areas: 
Levels are much higher in the latter. In 2010 the urban poverty rate was 
20 percent, whereas the rate in rural areas was 61 percent. For persons aged 
65 and older, the poverty rate was 16.7 percent in urban areas and 
58.0  percent in rural areas.
Figure 13.4 shows rates for extreme poverty by age and by urban or rural area. 
The patterns by age and area are similar to those for the total poverty rate, but 
the incidence of extreme poverty in rural areas is much higher compared to 
urban areas. Essentially, extreme poverty affects the  country’s rural population 
much more. For persons aged 65 and older, the extreme poverty rate was 
2.0  percent in urban areas and 24.5 percent in rural areas.
Figure 13.2 literacy rate, by Age Group and Area, 2007
Source: Based on 2007 Population and Housing Census, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática (INEI).
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Figure 13.4 extreme poverty rate, by Age and by Urban or rural Area, 2010
Source: Based on National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2010.
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Figure 13.3 poverty rate, by Age and by Urban or rural Area
Source: Based on National Household Survey, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) 2010. 
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Similarly the differences among regions can be quite obvious. Although the 
incidence of poverty among individuals aged 65 and older exceeds 50 percent in 
Apurimac, Huancavelica, Puno, Huanuco, Cajamarca, and Ayacucho, it is below 
13 percent in Lima, Tumbes, Ica, and Madre de Dios. Similarly, extreme poverty 
among the population as a whole can reach levels above 25 percent of the popu-
lation (Apurimac and Huanuco) or less than 1 percent (Tumbes and Madre de 
Dios) (table 13.3).
Health is an important component of well-being, especially among the elderly, 
because their quality of life can deteriorate rapidly if their illnesses and discom-
forts are not treated adequately and opportunely. In particular, untreated ill-
nesses can worsen and affect an elderly person’s independence and autonomy. 
Peru faces a high percentage of the elderly that do not seek medical attention 
for their illnesses or they do so inadequately: They go to pharmacies or use 
table 13.3 total poverty rate and among 65+ population, by region, 2010
Percent
Region
Total population
Region
Population age 65 and older
Poverty Extreme poverty Poverty Extreme poverty
Huancavelica 63.0 21.8 Apurimac 64.0 30.2
Apurimac 62.0 24.1 Huancavelica 57.8 22.7
Cajamarca 55.2 23.0 Puno 56.3 23.3
Huanuco 54.7 22.1 Huanuco 51.0 25.5
Amazonas 50.5 18.6 Cajamarca 50.4 24.8
Loreto 49.8 19.5 Ayacucho 50.4 22.9
Puno 48.6 15.8 Loreto 44.8 15.4
Ayacucho 48.2 17.0 Pasco 42.1 17.1
Piura 44.3 9.6 Cusco 42.1 15.8
Cusco 42.7 12.4 Piura 41.9 8.1
Lambayeque 38.2 4.6 Lambayeque 41.2 7.5
San Martin 36.9 10.1 Amazonas 39.0 10.8
Pasco 36.3 8.5 San Martin 34.5 5.9
La Libertad 31.4 9.7 La Libertad 27.5 6.7
Junin 28.4 3.9 Junin 26.8 4.5
Ancasch 27.1 4.4 Ancash 24.6 5.6
Ucayali 21.7 4.2 Moquegua 19.6 3.4
Tumbes 19.7 0.2 Tacna 16.2 3.3
Lima 16.2 1.0 Ucayali 15.3 2.3
Moquegua 14.3 1.4 Arequipa 14.2 2.7
Tacna 14.2 1.1 Ica 12.6 0.5
Arequipa 13.6 1.9 Lima 11.9 1.1
Ica 12.4 0.2 Tumbes 11.3 0.3
Madre de Dios 5.0 0.5 Madre de Dios 3.1 0.0
Total 30.8 7.6 Total 28.4 8.3
Source: Based on National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2010.
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traditional medicines. Indeed, 60 percent of the population aged 65 and older 
belongs to this category. However, significant differences are seen when the 
elderly population is categorized by poverty level: 82 percent, 72 percent, and 
54 percent of the extremely poor, non-extreme poor, and non-poor, respectively, 
do not seek treatment for their illnesses or seek insufficient treatment. 
Differences also appear by geographic area; 54 percent of the elderly population 
does not seek medical attention for their illnesses or seeks insufficient attention 
in urban areas, and this percentage increases to 73 percent in rural areas.
With the help of population projections by region from the INEI (2010a) for 
1995–2025, it is possible to estimate the survival rate for each age cohort for 
various years. Table 13.4 shows the probability of survival for the cohort of indi-
viduals that were 65 years old in 2012. For example, for each 100 people in Lima 
in 2012 that were aged 65, 74 would survive until 2025. In contrast, in 
Huancavelica, only 48 of 100 individuals would survive until 2025. The correla-
tions between the survival rate until 2025 by region and the poverty rates are 
table 13.4 probability of survival to Age 65, calculated in 2012
Percent
Region 2012 2015 2020 2025
Lima 100.0 95.4 86.3 73.6
Callao 100.0 94.5 85.1 72.5
Arequipa 100.0 94.7 84.7 72.1
Lambayeque 100.0 94.6 84.8 72.1
La Libertad 100.0 94.7 84.2 71.0
Ica 100.0 94.7 83.6 70.5
Moquegua 100.0 94.5 83.0 68.3
Tacna 100.0 93.7 82.3 68.0
Ucayali 100.0 93.0 78.9 63.4
Puno 100.0 93.6 80.0 64.0
Ancash 100.0 93.0 78.9 63.4
Tumbes 100.0 91.5 78.5 62.8
Huanuco 100.0 92.7 78.4 62.7
Piura 100.0 91.6 78.2 62.5
Madre de Dios 100.0 91.5 78.1 62.0
Junin 100.0 91.8 77.9 61.8
San Martin 100.0 91.4 76.8 60.6
Cusco 100.0 92.1 77.1 59.9
Cajamarca 100.0 92.0 76.1 58.8
Pasco 100.0 90.7 74.8 57.1
Loreto 100.0 90.9 74.8 56.9
Apurimac 100.0 91.5 74.5 56.6
Ayacucho 100.0 91.9 74.8 55.9
Amazonas 100.0 90.4 73.1 54.3
Huancavelica 100.0 89.1 69.9 48.2
Source: Based on Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática (INEI) 2010a.
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negative and significant,2 which means that higher poverty and elderly mortality 
are associated.
One especially interesting aspect of the difficulties facing the elderly popula-
tion is that the lack of regular income, for example, from a pension, forces indi-
viduals to work until they have exhausted their abilities at the expense of their 
health and integrity, or for their entire lives. This has been defined as “ceaseless 
toil” by Benjamin, Brandt, and Fan (2003) when analyzing the labor supply of the 
elderly in rural China. Kassouf, Rodriguez, and Aquino (2011) confirm that with-
out the noncontributory pension in Brazil, the elderly would not be able to retire 
from the labor market. In Peru the employment rate of the elderly is much 
higher in rural areas than in urban areas.3 Figure 13.5 (with a three-unit moving 
average) shows that the difference between elderly men in a condition of 
extreme poverty in rural areas and men not living in poverty in urban areas grows 
with age up until about 78 years old. From 65 to 75 years of age the employment 
rate remains between 90 percent and 100 percent for men in rural areas, but it 
drops to between 70 percent and 40 percent for non-poor men in urban areas. 
This could indicate that individuals in rural areas cannot retire from the labor 
market like those living in urban areas are able to do and are forced to continue 
working.4
The figures from table 13.5 complement figure 13.5. Comparing the employ-
ment rates between the elderly population in extreme poverty and the popula-
tion not living in poverty—without differentiating by area—we observe that 
94 percent of extremely poor men between 65 and 69 years old are working 
Figure 13.5 male population Aged 65 Years and older, by Age, Area, and 
condition of poverty, 2010
Source: Based on National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2010.
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Figure 13.6 population not enrolled in Any pension system, by Age, Area, and 
condition of poverty, 2010
Source: Based on National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2010.
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whereas the corresponding rate is 71.3 percent for men in the same age group 
that are not living in poverty. This means there is a gap of 22.7 percentage points 
between the two groups. This gap grows to 48.4 points if we compare the 
extremely poor and nonpoor in the 75–79 years old age group. If we analyze 
these gaps in rural and urban areas, we find that the gaps are more significant in 
urban areas than in rural areas.
The problem of low pension coverage among the elderly has its counterpart 
among persons who are almost old enough to join this age group (figure 13.6). 
Approximately two-thirds of the population between 44 and 64 years old is 
not enrolled in a contributory pension system. Even among those who are 
enrolled, not all of them will gain access to a pension because they do not 
table 13.5 male population Aged 65 and older, by Age Group, Area, and condition of poverty, 2010
Percent
Age
Urban Rural Total
Extreme 
poor
Non-
extreme 
poor
Non-
poor Total
Extreme 
poor
Non-
extreme 
poor
Non-
poor Total
Extreme 
poor
Non-
extreme 
poor
Non-
poor Total
65–69 78.3 73.0 65.7 67.1 96.6 94.2 95.4 95.3 94.0 81.6 71.3 74.9
70–74 66.0 56.8 45.9 47.8 89.9 96.8 91.4 93.0 84.4 78.0 55.1 61.6
75–79 92.0 51.3 32.4 36.4 87.9 89.1 84.6 87.1 88.4 68.1 40.0 50.7
80 and older 74.9 36.2 22.1 26.1 51.9 73.2 68.5 66.0 58.3 53.2 29.5 36.9
Source: Based on National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2010.
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contribute regularly. Individuals younger than 65 years old that live in extreme 
poverty in rural areas are the most unlikely to be covered by a pension pro-
gram, with percentages near 100 percent. The non-poor rural population 
exhibits a similar lack of coverage, with more than 80 percent not enrolled in 
a formal pension system. In total, this could indicate a social protection prob-
lem that affects both the current population of elderly as well as those who will 
soon form part of this group.
Development of Social Security
The structure of the current Peruvian pension system dates to 1993 when 
Decree-Law no. 25,897 created the Private Pension System (Sistema Privado de 
Pensiones [SPP]), which is based on individually funded accounts. Additionally, 
this system coexists and “competes” with the National Pension System (Sistema 
Nacional de Pensiones [SNP]), which was created in 1973 as the result of the 
merger of sectoral funds that had been created decades before and is organized 
as a public defined benefit system. There are also pension regimes designed to 
cover specific groups, such as the Military and Police Personnel Regime (Régimen 
del Personal Militar y Policial), and those that have already been closed to new 
workers but continue to pay pensions, such as the Social Benefits Fund for 
Fishers (Caja de Beneficios Sociales del Pescador) and the fund for government 
workers called Living Credential (Cédula Viva, Decree-Law no. 20,530).
The SNP offers pensions calculated based on its pension rules. These rules 
include a minimum contribution period of 20 years, minimum and maximum 
pension values, and a replacement rate that depends on the number of contribu-
tions made and the cohort of birth of the beneficiary. As with any defined benefit 
system, the financial sustainability of the SNP is mainly based on the ratio of 
contributors to pensioners.
Conversely, the SPP is a self-financing system because it is based on individu-
ally funded accounts. Each insured member has to choose from one of four exist-
ing Pension Fund Administrators (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones 
[AFPs]) that will manage and invest his or her contributions and the returns they 
generate. At retirement age, the member has access to the final balance of his or 
her account and must choose one of several pension options offered by different 
insurance companies in the market or from the AFP that administered the 
account. These options include scheduled withdrawals, full annuities, or annuities 
combined with withdrawals and different percentages for spousal pensions.
The retirement age for women and men is 65 years in both systems. The con-
tribution rate is a fixed percentage of total monthly salary. Currently this rate is 
13 percent for the SNP and 10 percent for the SPP. The AFP charges a commis-
sion and an insurance premium as a percentage of the insured’s salary, which 
total about 3 percent. The SNP offers a minimum pension to all insured mem-
bers as long as they meet certain requirements. In contrast, the SPP guarantees 
a minimum pension for individuals born before 1945 that have contributed on 
a salary base of at least one minimum salary for at least 20 years in any 
pension system.
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Performance of the Pension System
At the end of 2010, the economically active population affiliated with any pen-
sion system was 7.2 million people, of which 4.6 million belonged to the SPP and 
2.6 million to the SNP, equivalent to 29.6 percent and 16.3 percent of the labor 
force, respectively. This means that less than half of the labor force was insured 
by a pension system. However, if we consider only contributors, that is, those 
members that regularly contribute to the pension system, only 19.2 percent of 
the labor force effectively contributes and could access a pension in the future. 
This low regular participation of workers inside the pension system in Peru lays 
the foundation for the vulnerability that these individuals will suffer when they 
join the elderly population, because they will have fewer tools to face old age. 
The SPP pension fund added up to S/. 87.296 billion, equivalent to US$31.088 
billion or 20.4 percent of GDP.
Given that social security generally follows the Bismarckian model, which is 
based on insurance through formal paid work, this system offers limited coverage 
in economies with a highly informal labor market, as is the case in Peru. This is 
one of the principal causes of the persistent low coverage of the pension system, 
even after the structural pension reform undertaken at the beginning of the 
1990s. In 2010 just 26 percent of individuals aged 65 and older were receiving a 
pension (Rofman and Oliveri 2012). Although participation in the pension sys-
tem increases along with the income quintile, we take note that the participation 
rate never reaches a very high level, even in the highest income quintiles. For 
example, in 2010 among the richest 20 percent of the population, only 
58  percent of the elderly were covered by a pension system (table 13.6).
table 13.6 coverage rates for the elderly, by per capita Family income Quintile, 
1995–2010
Percent
Year Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
1995 6.78 15.37 25.76 37.83 56.00
1998 4.02 10.69 29.75 43.94 61.86
1999 2.59 18.00 24.76 45.13 67.35
2000 2.58 15.39 26.78 34.43 61.32
2001 2.12 10.35 23.83 40.70 53.4
2002 0.85 8.27 23.32 40.42 56.49
2003 0.95 8.27 22.22 41.51 58.46
2004 2.14 10.30 24.09 42.21 55.95
2005 3.22 9.20 22.60 38.24 62.57
2006 1.98 9.16 25.90 40.20 61.50
2007 1.03 9.34 26.36 38.64 58.79
2008 1.43 9.62 25.45 40.84 56.67
2009 1.83 7.20 20.35 39.38 56.66
2010 1.50 7.88 23.65 38.32 58.43
Source: Rofman and Oliveri 2012.
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Table 13.7 also shows very marked differences between pension coverage in 
urban and rural areas. In fact, 5.60 percent of the population aged 65 and older in 
rural areas received a pension in 2010, but this percentage reached 38.05 percent 
in urban areas. Similarly, contributors make up 4.65 percent of the economically 
active population (EAP) in rural areas and 25.4 percent in urban areas.
When we disaggregate the percentage of the elderly that receive a pension 
from the contributory system by region and age, we observe a marked  asymmetry. 
Figure 13.7 shows that older individuals are those that are more likely to have a 
pension. Of the total of elderly from ages 65 to 69, only 22 percent receive a pen-
sion, whereas 39.7 percent of individuals aged 80 to 84 receive one.5 The differ-
ences between regions are also very noticeable. For example, 28.8 percent of 
individuals aged 65–69 in urban areas receive a pension, but this percentage falls 
to 3.8 percent for the same group in rural areas.
The differences among the elderly in terms of having a pension disaggregated 
by condition of poverty and gender are also significant. Only 0.7 percent of the 
elderly in extreme poverty have a pension, but that percentage is 10.4 percent 
for the non-extreme poor and 36.6 percent for the non-poor (table 13.8). Only 
0.5 percent of the elderly living in extreme poverty in rural areas have a con-
tributory pension, meaning that there is an enormous social protection gap for 
this group. In contrast, 42.1 percent of the non-poor elderly that live in urban 
table 13.7 evolution of the coverage rate among the eAp, employed persons, 
and the elderly, by region, 1995–2010
Percent
Year
Contributors/EAP Contributors/employed
Beneficiaries/65 and 
older population
Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban
1995 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 28.36 6.70 40.59
1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 24.50 5.34 36.59
1997 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 27.47 7.00 38.49
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 29.85 6.73 41.97
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 31.52 9.63 42.10
2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 28.40 5.09 40.67
2001 13.70 3.06 19.16 14.24 3.09 20.46 25.91 5.21 37.22
2002 13.88 3.73 19.07 14.41 3.79 20.32 25.74 4.74 37.01
2003 14.83 3.78 20.74 15.24 3.85 21.85 26.19 5.72 38.80
2004 14.68 3.93 20.24 15.21 4.02 21.57 26.91 5.44 40.06
2005 12.42 3.35 17.27 13.08 3.40 18.69 27.16 6.42 39.48
2006 13.96 3.34 19.40 14.61 3.38 20.81 27.67 5.69 40.15
2007 15.96 3.68 22.14 16.59 3.69 23.45 26.79 6.94 38.42
2008 16.82 3.98 23.30 17.37 4.00 24.48 26.65 5.93 38.75
2009 18.33 4.65 25.34 18.92 4.65 26.66 25.09 5.72 37.17
2010 18.48 4.65 25.41 19.05 4.66 26.64 25.93 5.60 38.05
Source: Rofman and Oliveri 2012.
Note: EAP = economically active population; n.a = not applicable.
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areas have a contributory pension. In terms of gender, we observe even more 
pronounced inequalities. Just 0.1 percent of women aged 65 and older living in 
extreme poverty in rural areas have a contributory pension, which is a negligible 
coverage rate. In contrast, 45.6 percent of non-poor elderly men living in urban 
areas have a pension. It is important to stress that, in terms of survival, there is a 
positive correlation (0.58 and significant) between the percentage of individuals 
aged 65 and over with a pension in each region and the probability of survival 
until 2025.
Even while recognizing some of the advantages of a regime like the SPP, it 
must be mentioned that its implementation has been very costly. On the one 
hand, the government has approximately S/. 13 billion in recognition bonds 
that have been delivered or are pending delivery to enrolled members that 
Figure 13.7 elderly with Any contributory pension, by Age, 2010
Source: Based on National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2010.
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table 13.8 population Aged 65 and older with Any contributory pension, by Gender, Area, 
and poverty, 2010
Percent
Total Men Women
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural
Extreme poverty 0.7 1.4 0.5 1.4 2.9 1.1 0.1 0 0.1
Non-extreme poverty 10.4 17.2 2.8 15.4 24.0 5.2 6.1 11.1 0.8
No poverty 36.6 42.1 9.0 45.6 52.7 12.7 28.7 33.0 5.3
Total 28.4 37.6 4.9 36.0 47.3 7.6 21.7 29.3 2.4
Source: Based on National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2010.
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switched from the SNP to the SPP. On the other hand, the government Treasury 
must also transfer funds to pay SNP pensioners because the members who 
would be paying these pensions have transferred to the SPP. For the latter con-
cept, the government has disbursed approximately S/. 26.4 billion since 1995, 
which is equal to about 6.2 percent of GDP. In recent years, the Treasury has 
paid on average the equivalent of about 0.5 percent of GDP annually. These 
transfers from the Treasury will continue and will even increase during the 
 coming years because the SNP’s contribution base, after being reduced by 
the creation of the SPP, is not sufficient to pay the pensions. The most recent 
calculation of the SNP’s actuarial reserve—which is equivalent to how much 
the government should “save” today to pay future pensions—is S/. 100 billion, 
or 23.4 percent of GDP.
recent reforms Aimed at improving pension coverage
Social security based on the Bismarckian model, that is, insurance through formal 
paid employment, has limited coverage in economies with highly informal labor 
markets,6 as is the case in Peru. This is one of the principal causes behind the 
pension system’s persistent low coverage levels. In recent years a series of pro-
posed and implemented reforms have taken place with the goal of extending 
coverage to the elderly population. The launch of the Pension 65 program stands 
out among these reforms. This program offers coverage to the elderly that do not 
have a pension and live in extreme poverty.
The Reforms
Ley Mype
Since the SPP was created, the government has made various regulatory changes 
mainly focused on the system’s efficiency, costs, and investments. Similarly, in 
2004 the government made important changes to the public systems, especially 
with the closure to new workers of the Living Credential program that had cov-
ered public servants (Law no. 20,530), and a series of changes to the SNP’s pen-
sion rules. In 2008 the government issued a regulation with the goal of expanding 
pension coverage via the SME Law (Ley Mype, D.S. no. 007-2008-TR), which 
created social pensions for workers in microenterprises.
The idea behind the law is that microenterprises and their workers should join 
the Social Pension System (Sistema de Pensiones Sociales)—based on individual 
accounts—and contribute an established minimum amount, on top of which the 
government would add another contribution. This was one interesting initiative 
and the first that sought to expand coverage, but it was not implemented, and it 
did not have the necessary political support.
SPP Reform Law of 2012
In November 2011 a technical group of experts was created to recommend 
reforms to the SPP with the goals of improving the system’s efficiency 
and increasing pension coverage. This group was made up of academics and 
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public servants. The closest counterpart to the formation of this commission is 
the Marcel Commission in Chile, which carried out a broad reform of the 
Chilean pension system in 2008. Up to now there has not been an official docu-
ment produced by the Peruvian commission, and it stopped meeting in March 
2012. Congress passed the reform bill sent by the Ministry of the Economy and 
Finances (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas [MEF]), which among other things 
seeks to expand pension coverage in two main ways. On the one hand, the 
reform would make it mandatory for all self-employed workers under age 40 to 
join an AFP or the National System. On the other hand it would create social 
pensions for workers that earn up to 1.5 times the Minimum Living Wage 
(Remuneración Mínima Vital). These pensions are based on a matching contri-
butions scheme, that is, the government would pay a subsidy for each contribu-
tion that a worker makes.
The pension reform bill has not been free of controversy given that its intro-
duction to Congress and debate has followed an unusual path.7 Much criticism 
has been seen in the news media of the virtues of the approved reform, both 
technical as well as legal, and the way in which it was carried out, which have 
eroded its legitimacy to some extent. Currently, the Constitutional Tribunal is 
evaluating a lawsuit alleging unconstitutionality due to the new form of paying 
funds management fees (based on the balance) and the bidding for the flow of 
new members.
Social Pensions
In July 2010 the Gratitude Bonus (Bono Gratitud) social pension pilot program 
was created, and it began to function in October of that year. Under this pro-
gram, all elderly over age 75 and living in poverty receive a pension of S/. 100 per 
month, equal to about US$36. This was the first attempt to create noncontribu-
tory pensions in Peru, but the number of registered users was reduced and a 
series of accusations surrounded the delivery of benefits to individuals that did 
not meet the requirements. In August 2011 the Gratitude program had 21,783 
beneficiaries nationally and was found in the following regions: Amazonas, 
Ancash, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Cusco, Huancavelica, Huanuco, Junin, 
Puno, La Libertad, Lima, Callao, and Piura. The last four regions have a signifi-
cant population living in urban areas and experiencing less poverty.
The Pension 65 program was created October 19, 2011, and began operations 
in November. Beneficiaries of the Gratitude program were absorbed into the 
Pension 65 program. To be a beneficiary of the Pension 65 program, an individual 
must fulfill a series of requirements, including being 65 years old and above; liv-
ing in extreme poverty according to the Household Targeting System (Sistema 
de Focalización de Hogares [SISFOH]); and not receiving any pension or grant 
from any public or private entity, including Social Health Insurance (Seguro 
Social de Salud [ESSALUD]) as well as other social programs, except for 
Comprehensive Health Insurance (Seguro Integral de Salud [SIS]), the National 
Movement for Literacy Program (Programa Nacional de Movilización por la 
Alfabetización), and the Reparations Programs from Law no. 28,592 (for victims, 
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and their family members, of the violence from 1980 to 2000). As of May 2012, 
the program had registered 126,787 beneficiaries.
The pension amount is low, but its relative weight varies depending on the 
region and the indicator for comparison. The transfer of S/. 125 (approximately 
US$46) represents 33 percent of the national per capita spending, but the rela-
tive weight of this transfer is much greater in rural areas (table 13.9). The transfer 
represents 53 percent of per capita spending for families in rural areas, whereas 
in urban areas this percentage is just 22 percent. Additionally, the pension 
amount represents 60 percent of the rural poverty line and 91 percent of the 
rural extreme poverty line.
Additionally, the program contemplates connecting existing health care ser-
vices among the managing institutions (Ministry of Health, public health centers, 
posts, etc.) and the beneficiary elderly of the social pensions. Another component 
that comes with the program is the promotion and strengthening of the social 
support networks for the elderly.
The Political Economy of Pension Reforms
The policy debate on pensions in Peru is characterized by several distinct fea-
tures. First, the country does not have many experts on the subject, and the varia-
tion in opinions on normative issues is minimal. Second, the topic is complex, 
but despite that thought leaders and authorities support specific social security 
policies without considering the effects they will have. In effect, there is not 
enough academic research on the subject of pensions in Peru, and society does 
not value the important efforts put forth by the institutions with significant roles 
dealing with the problems. Moreover, there is limited microeconomic and 
administrative information available on members and pensioners that could 
enable researchers to undertake better academic and independent research 
table 13.9 monthly poverty lines in 2010 and the pension 65 Benefit
Urban Rural National
Amount in nuevos soles
Poverty line 293 208 264
Extreme poverty line 155 137 149
Per capita expenditure 571 263 454
Minimum pensiona 484 484 484
Minimum living wagea 750 750 750
Percentage that Pension 65 represents = S/. 125
Poverty line 43 60 47
Extreme poverty line 81 91 84
Per capita expenditure 22 53 28
Minimum pension 26 26 26
Minimum living wage 17 17 17
Source: Based on Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática (INEI) 2011 and National Household Survey 
(ENAHO) 2010.
a. Values in 2012.
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projects, nor are specialized surveys available on topics related to pensions. The 
regulations sent by the MEF and the Superintendent of Banking, Insurance, and 
AFP (SBS) to Congress are complex and are not completely explained. Outside 
the more specialized Economy Committee, congresspersons continue proposing 
regulations without considering the adverse effects they could create. At the 
same time, the more technical regulations are approved with little debate and 
without understanding their effects very well.
Third, the debate is emotional and is rooted in political positions and values. 
The public debate provoked as a result of the noncontributory Pension 65 pro-
posal during the last electoral campaign from February to May 2011 is interest-
ing. One persistent idea in the debate was that persons who had never contributed 
to a pension system did not deserve to receive a pension from the government. 
On the other hand, opinion makers and authorities estimated enormous costs 
for the noncontributory pension with the goal of weakening the proposal. 
However, it should also be mentioned that complete information was not avail-
able on the program’s design. Three former Ministers of Economy expressed 
such views. The estimated costs that were published in the news media varied 
from S/. 3 billion to S/. 14 billion (from 0.7 percent to 3.3 percent of GDP). 
However, once the proposal is implemented, it is expected to cost around 
S/. 400 million, or 0.09 percent of GDP.
Perceptions of what is right on the subject of pensions are based on more 
general values about how society should be organized and the exchanges that 
take place within it. In some ways, it is not surprising that one of the most popu-
lar arguments against Pension 65 has been that those who have not contributed 
do not deserve a pension. Table 13.10 presents the results of the last version of 
the World Values Survey in selected Latin American countries. We observe that 
Peru is the country where most people believe that “each person should individu-
ally assume more responsibility in order to make his or her own living” in contrast 
to “the government should assume more responsibility for providing a living to 
everyone.” Support for this value is the majority position in both lower and upper 
social classes.
table 13.10 percentage of people Who think “each person should individually Assume 
more responsibility in order to make his or her own living”
Brazil Colombia Uruguay Chile Argentina Guatemala Mexico Peru
Upper middle class 43.0 n.a. 46.3 41.5 41.5 n.a. n.a. 56.0
Lower middle class 30.3 n.a. 33.2 35.8 42.2 n.a. n.a. 57.0
Working class 27.1 n.a. 37.6 37.6 38.1 n.a. n.a. 54.6
Lower class 29.3 n.a. 29.5 34.9 32.7 n.a. n.a. 53.3
Total 29.0 33.3 35.6 37.2 39.3 44.9 47.0 55.5
Source: Based on the World Values Survey, fifth wave (2004–08).
Note: For the survey question, the respondent should express his or her position on a scale of 1–10 between “The government 
should assume more responsibility for providing a living to everyone” (=1) and “each person should individually assume more 
responsibility in order to make his or her own living” (=10). The figures in the table indicate the percentage of people that 
expressed a score from 6 to 10. n.a. = not applicable.
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Finally, in Peru we do not find a comprehensive vision for the pension system. 
This observation is validated by the way in which the social security institutions 
are organized. The SBS supervises the AFPs, the Office of Social Security 
Regulation (Oficina de Normalización Previsional) regulates and administers the 
SNP and other public systems, the MEF regulates the public systems and the SPP 
in terms of laws, the Central Bank (Banco Central de la Reserva del Perú) sets 
some operational investment limits for the AFPs and manages the Consolidated 
Reserves Fund (Fondo Consolidado de Reservas) for the public system, the 
Superintendent of Taxes Administration (Superintendencia de Administración 
Tributaria) collects contributions for the public systems, and the Ministry of 
Development and Social Inclusion (Ministerio de Desarrollo e Inclusión Social 
[MIDIS]) manages the noncontributory Pension 65 program.
As a result of this multiplicity of institutions, a comprehensive pension policy 
does not exist. Each institution defends its jurisdiction and regulates without a 
global vision. Even inside the MEF—an institution that could help unify the 
visions in some way—the section in charge of the private system is in a different 
vice ministry than the section in charge of the public systems.
Pension 65 Targeting
The Pension 65 program’s targeting strategy has two stages. First, geographic 
targeting is applied (selection of districts) based on the 2009 poverty map 
from the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 
[INEI]). Within these districts, a second stage uses the targeting system 
applied in other social programs (known as Sistema de Focalización de 
Hogares [SISFOH]), which maintains a General Household Registry (Padrón 
General de Hogares [PGH]) with information on all of the households con-
sidered eligible for social programs. SISFOH sends the program the list of 
potential users created based on the PGH and also sends the socioeconomic 
categorization of those potential users identified by the program. Based on 
this information, the program proceeds to verify compliance with the 
requirements and whether potential beneficiaries are alive. The verification 
that Pension 65 beneficiaries are still living is carried out in coordination with 
municipalities and other entities. This verification can also be performed by 
comparing the registry of users with the National Identification and Civil 
Status Registry (Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil). The 
program can also request that SISFOH reevaluate its users.
Nonetheless, we must specify that because the SISFOH system has not yet 
registered all households, there is an exception rule for individual targeting in 
those districts where the program has already begun to operate. This rule states 
that potential beneficiaries that live in urban districts with more than 50 percent 
extreme poverty or in rural districts with more than 30 percent are considered 
eligible without the need to verify their individual socioeconomic conditions. 
This rule will continue to be applied in those districts where implementation is 
already underway even if the SISFOH database is completed. In contrast, in 
the districts where implementation is not yet underway, individual targeting 
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will apply. According to estimates from MIDIS, the number of potential users 
could reach 273,529 in 2012 and 323,672 in 2018.
Although the program began operations recently at the end of 2011, some 
information is available that allows us to see its fast growth. It reached 54,122 
users in January, 78,657 in March, and finally 126,787 in May 2012. Additionally, 
the program has been able to establish links with geriatric health care services 
between users and the Ministry of Health, but no data are available regarding this 
service yet. In terms of the effects of the program, the authorities plan to carry 
out a baseline measurement in 2012 with the goal of obtaining an impact mea-
surement in 2013.
In terms of targeting, with the data currently available, we can observe only 
the geographic targeting component, that is, at the district level. Based on the last 
user registry from May 2012 and the 2009 Poverty Map (INEI 2010b), it is pos-
sible to see the level of poverty in the districts where Pension 65 beneficiaries 
live. Figure 13.8 shows the cumulative number of beneficiaries on the vertical 
axis and the incidence of existing poverty (ordered from least to greatest) in the 
respective districts on the horizontal axis. Thus, it is easy to observe that approxi-
mately 20 percent of the program’s beneficiaries live in districts with 50 percent 
or less of the population in a condition of poverty. This could indicate a certain 
level of leakages, but we must remember that Pension 65 inherited some benefi-
ciaries from the old Gratitude program, who lived in urban districts with lower 
Figure 13.8 District-level targeting of pension 65 Beneficiaries, 2012
Source: Based on Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática (INEI) 2010b; Pension 65 user registry.
Note: Only districts with at least one beneficiary are considered.
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poverty rates. Additionally, the analysis based on geographic targeting is limited 
because it does not account for the concentrations (“pockets”) of poverty in 
urban cities, which are diminished by the statistical effects of measuring poverty 
for an entire district.
Figure 13.9 allows us to observe how the Gratitude program affects the tar-
geting of the Pension 65 program and if the way in which the program operates 
has meant an improvement in terms of targeting. As before, we constructed the 
ratios between the cumulative number of beneficiaries and the level of poverty 
in the districts in which they live. The blue curve represents the beneficiaries of 
the Gratitude program, and the orange curve represents those of the Pension 65 
program (i.e., the old Gratitude beneficiaries and the new enrollees). We can 
observe a clear improvement in targeting. After the curves intersect, which 
occurs approximately in the districts with 50 percent poverty, Pension 65 
includes more beneficiaries in the poorest districts. It is also clear that before this 
intersection, the Gratitude program included more beneficiaries from the less 
poor districts.
In terms of the program’s coverage, a total of 55.7 percent of districts do not 
have a single beneficiary. If we were to consider only the districts with an inci-
dence of poverty of at least 50 percent, the district subcoverage rate would be 
Figure 13.9 District-level Beneficiary targeting for pension 65 and Gratitude
Source: Based on Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática (INEI) 2010b; Pension 65 user registry.
Note: Only districts with at least one beneficiary are considered.
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42.1 percent. An approximate measure of the penetration rate comes out to 
28.3 percent, which indicates the percentage of districts with at least 50 percent 
poverty that have at least one program beneficiary. Table 13.11 presents further 
details.
Program Costs
The program is not costly in fiscal terms. With the data about potential benefi-
ciaries it is possible to simply and rapidly obtain the cost of the program, at least 
of the portion corresponding to transfers to the elderly. It can be estimated that 
in 2012 Pension 65 will cost approximately S/. 410 million, or 0.09 percent of 
GDP, without including the program’s administrative costs. If the pension 
amount remains the same and we assume a conservative GDP growth rate of 
3 percent, then during the coming years the program’s cost would remain around 
0.08 percent of GDP. Additionally, the population aged 65 and older covered by 
the program will be 14.8 percent in 2012 and will decrease slightly in the coming 
years (to 14.2 percent in 2018).
other services for the elderly
Contributory pensions provide links for access to health care services and other 
social programs. Furthermore, as we mentioned, Pension 65 has a component 
that connects with health care services from the Ministry of Health with an 
emphasis on geriatric care and a component to strengthen the social support 
networks for the elderly through the promotion of a greater priority for the 
elderly in the community agenda and the connection with social services.
Health Care Attention
Health is an important dimension of well-being for the elderly because their 
quality of life can deteriorate rapidly if their illnesses and discomforts are not 
table 13.11 Districts with pension 65 Beneficiaries, by poverty level, 2012
Incidence of poverty in 
the district
Districts with no 
beneficiaries
Districts with 
beneficiaries Total
Percentage of districts 
without beneficiaries
Less than 10% 35 28 63 55.6
10–20% 109 40 149 73.2
20–30% 157 52 209 75.1
30–40% 159 62 221 71.9
40–50% 144 58 202 71.3
50–60% 147 90 237 62.0
60–70% 113 145 258 43.8
70–80% 110 163 273 40.3
80–90% 41 138 179 22.9
Greater than 90% 7 38 45 15.6
Total 1,022 814 1,836 55.7
Source: Based on Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática (INEI) 2010b, 2010c; Pension 65 beneficiary registry.
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treated adequately and in a timely manner. Because contributory pensions in 
Peru are generally accompanied by health insurance (ESSALUD), the limited 
coverage of pensions also results in low health insurance coverage. Nonetheless, 
although approximately two-thirds of the elderly are enrolled in the SIS, the data 
show that many of them do not visit health care facilities to treat their illnesses 
because they do not have enough money and the facilities are located too far 
from their homes. Additionally, the lack of health care coverage for one-third of 
the elderly is a serious problem because this group will have more difficulties 
facing the risks that come with old age.
Approximately one-third of the elderly do not have any health insurance, 
whether they are poor or not poor; and among those elderly that are covered 
differences are found in the type of insurance (table 13.12). About 67.5 percent 
of extremely poor adults are enrolled in the SIS and 0.9 percent in ESSALUD.8 
In contrast, 45.9 percent of the elderly that are not poor are covered by 
ESSALUD and 18.2 percent by the SIS. Additionally, according to insurance 
status by region, we observe that the SIS has greater coverage among the 
extremely poor in urban areas than those in rural areas.
The interesting element of Pension 65 is that by including a health care com-
ponent the program resembles a social security scheme, which generally includes 
table 13.12 health insurance among the population Aged 65 and older, 2010
Percent
Type of 
insurance
Total Urban Rural
Extreme 
poor
Non-
extreme 
poor
Non-
poor Total
Extreme 
poor
Non-
extreme 
poor
Non-
poor Total
Extreme 
poor
Non-
extreme 
poor
Non-
poor Total
ESSALUD 0.9 15.1 45.9 36.1 2.7 25.2 52.2 47.4 0.5 3.6 13.5 7.0
Private health 
insurance
0.0 0.0 3.2 2.3 0.0 0.0 3.7 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
Health care 
services 
entity
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Armed forces/
police 
insurance
0.0 0.8 3.2 2.4 0.0 1.5 3.6 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.4
Comprehensive 
health 
insurance 
(SIS)
67.5 52.2 18.2 29.0 76.4 40.5 11.9 17.3 65.7 65.4 50.8 59.3
University 
insurance
0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private school 
insurance
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1
No insurance 31.4 31.8 29.3 29.9 20.2 32.6 28.3 28.7 33.7 31.0 34.3 33.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Based on National Household Survey (ENAHO) 2010.
Note: ESSALUD = Seguro Social de Salud; SIS = Seguro Integral de Salud.
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a pension and health insurance. Additionally, this scheme is justified as a way to 
alleviate the high levels of inequality of opportunity experienced in the past that 
were not corrected over time (Olivera 2011).
Social Support and Other Services
A series of initiatives and services for the elderly exist beyond income and health 
care protection. However, the elderly population’s participation is not significant, 
and in some cases these services are directed to specific groups, such as pension-
ers or insured members of the public pension system.
In turn, the noncontributory pension programs are focused on providing eco-
nomic security to the elderly, given the limitations that old age imposes on indi-
viduals. But another important process also takes place during aging: the 
weakening of social networks due to the loss of a spouse, groups of friends, and 
family members. The exchange of support is the basis of the existence of social 
networks. In a context of high informality and faced with minimal development 
of social security institutions, social support networks became an important ele-
ment for individuals to gain protection and satisfy unmet needs (Lomnitz 1994). 
Additionally, apart from the economic aspect, emotional needs are also a motiva-
tion for belonging to a network.
Social support for the elderly has positive effects on their well-being 
through the reduction of feelings of isolation and indirectly through the pro-
motion of healthy behaviors that provoke an increase in the resources and 
options related to health and well-being through direct emotional support 
(Pillemer et al. 2000). Additionally, according to Antonucci and Akiyama 
(1987), what really matters is the accumulation of communications from other 
individuals about how valuable, capable, and important a person is (or contin-
ues to be), and not so much the specific support. In this sense, the Barros 
(1991) study, with information from the elderly in Santiago de Chile, detected 
that belonging to an organization of elderly people contributed to the exchange 
of information on how to better take care of oneself, provided companionship 
and affection, and contributed to improving family relationships, as long as the 
elderly became more independent. In terms of health, it has been estab-
lished that people that have more social support networks can face illnesses, 
depression, stress, and other difficulties better (Antonucci and Akiyama 1987). 
Some studies find a negative relationship between social support for the 
elderly and mortality and morbidity (Antonucci and Jackson 1990; Berkman 
1984; Blazer 1982). In the Salinas, Manrique, and Téllez Rojo (2008) study on 
individuals that received the elderly component of the Opportunities program 
in Mexico, researchers found that the size of the network had a significant 
impact on the availability of support, and on economic, instrumental, and 
emotional support. Additionally, the authors point out that among the elderly 
population affiliated with the Opportunities program, having small and undi-
versified networks—which indicates excessive pressure on the network’s 
members—the program’s economic transfers and medical checkups become 
vitally important.
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In this sense, the positive effects of a noncontributory pension program on the 
elderly’s well-being could be strengthened if it were possible to incentivize 
the reinforcement of the elderly’s social support networks in some way. In Peru 
the elderly can benefit from the following initiatives.
Comprehensive Centers for Attention to the Elderly (Centros Integrales de 
Atención al Adulto Mayor [CIAM])
These centers seek to increase the social inclusion of the elderly and their family 
members. They seek the elderly population’s active and organized participation 
with other community members. They offer recreational, educational, and social 
activities, as well as health campaigns and the like. The Ministry of Women 
and Vulnerable Populations (Ministerio de la Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerables 
[MIMDES]) promotes the creation of these centers, but it is the responsibility of 
provincial and district municipalities to create and operate them. Law no. 28,803 
of 2006, the Law of the Peruvian Elderly (Ley del Adulto Mayor Peruano), man-
dates the creation of these centers. This law establishes that district and provin-
cial municipalities, in coordination with the Directorate of Elderly People of 
MIMDES, should create the CIAMs. According to the most recent figures from 
MIMDES’s portal, the creation of CIAMs in just 95 districts has been ordered, 
of the more than 1,800 districts that exist in Peru, which represents approxi-
mately 5 percent of districts.
Directorate of the Elderly (Dirección de Personas Adultas Mayores [DIPAM])
This MIMDES department is in charge of designing, monitoring, and following 
up on social policies directed at the elderly population. The DIPAM is responsi-
ble for promoting, coordinating, supervising, and evaluating the policies, plans, 
programs, and projects aimed at the elderly population, particularly for persons 
that suffer discrimination, social exclusion, poverty, and extreme poverty.
Center for the Elderly (Centro del Adulto Mayor [CAM])
The CAMs are centers where the elderly can receive educational workshops on 
emotional intelligence, art, productive activities, etc. They also organize elderly 
volunteers to help other elderly persons and offer prevention and treatment for 
illnesses, providing basic medicines. CAM services have no cost, but are directed 
only to the ESSALUD pensioner population (public system) that is elderly 
(older than 60 years). CAM offices are located in all regions throughout Peru, 
with a total of 121 centers in 2010. In 2010 the centers served 141,105 elderly 
persons.
Elderly Circles (Los Círculos del Adulto Mayor [CIRAM])
These are a social gerontological service offered by ESSALUD to insured elderly 
members, organized in associations in geographic areas where a CAM does not 
exist. The CIRAM’s basic set of activities are occupational, artistic, physical, self-
help, social tourism, and socio-cultural workshops. In 2010 the CIRAMs served 
12,460 participants.
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Elderly Club (Club del Adulto Mayor)
The Elderly Club is a department that exists within the Comprehensive 
Family Development Centers (Centros de Desarrollo Integral de la Familia 
[CEDIF]) that are administered by the National Comprehensive 
Family  Well-Being Program (Programa Integral Nacional para el Bienestar 
Familiar). Twenty-three CEDIFs are located in the provinces and 13 in Lima. 
The clubs are directed to individuals over 60 years old that live in poverty, 
extreme poverty, or without contact from family members. The purpose of the 
club is to provide the elderly with a set of activities that allow them to share 
experiences and moments of recreation and relaxation, which help raise their 
self-esteem and improve their quality of life. According to figures from 2011, 
the CEDIFs served a monthly average of 33,350 people, of which 2,139 were 
age 60 or older.
Residential Attention Centers for the Elderly (Centros de Atención Residencial 
para Personas Adultas Mayores [CARPAM])
These centers serve as homes for the elderly and offer social, medical, and psy-
chological support to their residents. MIMDES is in charge of supervising and 
regulating these centers. According to available figures, 21 of these centers are 
registered in Lima, and only six of them are public.
National Registry of Organizations for the Elderly (Registro Nacional de 
Organizaciones de Personas Adultas Mayores)
MIMDES promotes the registration of organizations for the elderly or that work 
with this population with the goal of developing collaboration among the mem-
bers of this group and building social networks that offer emotional support. By 
enrolling in the Public Registries, these organizations can join in the Participatory 
Budget in their community. Additionally, this registry is a means to formalize the 
association and register it with the local government as part of the municipal 
organizations. According to the most recent figures, there are 240 organizations 
that have a total of 30,706 members, of which 20,853 are women and 9,853 
are men.
conclusions
The goal of increasing pension coverage is positive in and of itself because it 
allows the elderly to retire from the labor market and pay for their needs during 
old age. Achieving this vision with just a contributory social security model in a 
context of high labor informality is not possible. Peru has 1.8 million elderly, of 
which only one-fourth receive a pension, with around half a million elderly are 
poor.
The Pension 65 program seeks to cover the gap left open by the contributory 
systems to supply the elderly with secure incomes that allow them to retire from 
the labor market and improve their living conditions. This presupposes, therefore, 
that the elderly necessarily require this transfer to be able to retire from the 
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market smoothly. Therefore, the program should identify the elderly that should 
be targeted, generally those that live in conditions of poverty.
Based on other experiences and the elderly population’s specific needs, the 
creation of the health care and social network components is positive for Pension 
65 beneficiaries. We have seen that very few of the elderly who live in poverty, 
and above all in rural areas, use health care services. Additionally, the initiatives 
that exist to promote social and health care services for this population group are 
scarce or limited to those insured by the public system. Therefore, connecting 
health care services and social networks as a part of Pension 65 is a positive step. 
Nonetheless, we need more evidence to understand the effects of the noncon-
tributory pension on the elderly and their families. The baseline measurement 
and impact studies planned during 2013–14 will shed more light on the pro-
gram’s effects and allow policy makers to put in place the necessary changes.
Another alternative to the targeted pension would be the creation of a univer-
sal benefit, but that would require the government to evaluate its cost and fiscal 
sustainability. It is important to offer social protection to the elderly, but the 
generosity and scope of the program should be decided within the framework of 
fiscal sustainability. One option for the government would be to promote and 
reinforce formality in the labor market so that individuals can contribute to a 
pension system, but this policy can require an extended period of effort before it 
demonstrates results. However, it is necessary that such a measure be accompa-
nied by social pensions for the elderly populations that had few opportunities to 
save for old age in the past.
Individual participation in a contributory pension system can definitively 
lessen the fiscal burden in the future. Without such participation, the govern-
ment must face growing costs to attend to the needs of the elderly without 
coverage. This is particularly relevant in the current context of aging, in which 
the population aged 65 and older today represents 6 percent of the total popula-
tion and in 2050 and 2100 will be 17.1 percent and 29.9 percent, respectively. 
These demographic changes will signify large movements in the population’s 
consumption and productivity patterns, at the same time that it will exert pres-
sure on the government to direct public spending toward older age groups.
notes
 1. Moving averages of five observations are used to adjust the series in the figure.
 2. The correlations between the probability of survival until 2025 and the poverty rate, 
the extreme poverty rate, and the poverty rate among those age 65 and older and the 
extreme poverty rate of said group are −0.7205, −0.7058, −0.5738, and −0.5681, 
respectively, with 99 percent confidence.
 3. The employment rate is defined as the number of employed persons of a certain age 
divided by the total population of the same age.
 4. We use statistics only for men because the percentage of women who are unemployed 
or without paid work can be very high (because of the traditional division of labor in 
the household), especially in rural areas.
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 5. This is associated with the fact that individuals that receive a pension are in general 
richer than those that do not receive a pension. They also have a higher level of educa-
tion and greater access to health care services. All of this greatly affects an individual’s 
probability of survival. In this sense, it is likely that the people with a greater probabil-
ity of surviving to older ages are pensioners.
 6. Based on the legalistic definition (workers that in their jobs are not forced to join 
social security or pay contributions) of formality described in Chong, Galdo, and 
Saavedra (2008), approximately 70 percent of jobs would be informal.
 7. See Valladares (2012) for a political analysis of this reform and the path it followed.
 8. SIS is a health insurance program administered by the government that prioritizes 
enrolling vulnerable populations that are living in poverty. ESSALUD refers to 
employees’ health insurance, which are mostly provided for those in formal salaried 
jobs.
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